Michigan Law Review
Volume 59

Issue 6

1961

Steinheimer: Michigan Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform
Commercial Code
Douglass G. Boshkoff
Wayne State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Legal Writing and Research Commons, and the State and
Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Douglass G. Boshkoff, Steinheimer: Michigan Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform Commercial Code,
59 MICH. L. REV. 984 (1961).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol59/iss6/13

This Book Reviews is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

984

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

MICHIGAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE. By Roy L. Steinheimer. Ann Arbor: Michigan Legal Publications.
1960. Pp. ix, 169. $1.50.
Promulgated in 1952 and adopted by the Pennsylvania Legislature in
1953, the Uniform Commercial Code has since been enacted in five additional
states: Massachusetts, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Connecticut. It is further reported that legislative consideration of it is now
underway, or soon to begin, in fourteen additional jurisdictions.1 Those
who favor the Code can point with pride to the progress, albeit in a lei1
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surely manner, of a statute immensely more detailed and comprehensive
than the Uniform Acts it seeks to replace. Its opponents can be cheered
by its lack of success in Ohio, New York, and Indiana, 2 and its slow rate
of progress in comparison with the important Uniform Acts which it would
replace.a
It is expected that in every state which considers the Code there will
be those who oppose it because it would change existing legal practices
and those who are willing to accept it on faith because of the status of its
sponsors. In between these extremes remain the vast majority of interested
parties: members of the bar, the public, and various commercial interests.
It is to this large class that Professor Steinheimer's study is addressed.
Current legal literature contains numerous general explanations of the
Code, including law review articles, a series of publications by the Joint
Committee of Continuing Legal Education of the American Law Institute
and the American Bar Association,4 and even the Official Comments appearing after each Code section. If the Code should eventually be adopted in a
large number of jurisdictions, the most important consideration in the
remaining states might be whether the desire for uniformity outweighs the
changes possibly made by it. At this early stage, however, the inquiry will
more likely emphasize the particular merits and demerits of the statute. In
this situation a detailed examination of the impact of the Code on the law
of a particular jurisdiction must precede a reasoned evaluation of it. Professor Steinheimer has provided the basis for such a judgment on Article 3
of the Code in Michigan.
This work, financed by the Michigan Bar Foundation, is a product of
the author's work on a special committee of the Michigan State Bar Association which is currently studying the Code. The presentation is straightforward. Each section in Article 3, which seeks to supplant the NIL, is reproduced and is followed by an examination of pertinent Michigan legal
materials together with a statement of how the Code would change the
present law. This format dictates that the book be used as a reference work
and not as an introduction to the Code. The section-by-section approach
presupposes some familiarity with negotiable instruments problems and the
structure of Article 3. For example, under present law, questions may arise
as to whether a signature on a negotiable instrument was made in the
2 Interesting descriptions of the trials and tribulations of the Code in several states
may be found in the NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CO!ll!IIISSIONERS ON UNIFOR!II STATE LAws
HANDBOOKS 100-06, 171-74 (1957); 95-ll7 (1958); 151-63, 189-93 (1959).
3 If the date of the first enactment is the most significant for comparative purposes,
the figures in parentheses following the listed Uniform Acts indicate the additional number
of jurisdictions which adopted the specified act within a seven-year period comparable to
the years 1953-1960: UNIFOR!II WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS Ac:r (30), UNIFOR!II NEGOTIABLE INSTRU!IIENTS LAW (23), UNIFOR!II BILLS OF LADING A<::r (21), UNIFOR!II TRUST RECEIPTS A<::r
(12), UNIFOR!II SALES Ac:r (10).
4 HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES (1958); BRAUCHER, DOCU!IIENTS OF TITLE (1958);
CLARKE, BAILEY & YOUNG, BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS (1959); HAWKLAND, CO!lr!IIERCIAL PAPER (1959); SPIVAK, SECURED TRANSACTIONS (1960).
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capacity of maker or indorser. Under section 3-402 of the Code the signer
is liable only as an indor.ser unless the instrument clearly indicates that the
signature is in another capacity. But what is to be done with a note containing the words "I promise to pay" and signed by two parties? Section
3-ll8 (e) precludes the argument that they are both liable only as indorsers,
and not as makers, by making them jointly and severally liable in the absence of other .specifications in the instrument. Further, the related problem
of the effect of words of guaranty is governed by sections 3-202 (4) and
3-416. Professor Steinheimer assumes the reader knows this and his discussion starts from there.Ii
The value of such an approach depends upon the aim of the book. If it
were assumed that the book was to be read by those completely ignorant of
the Code, then this treatment of various provisions would seriously diminish
the value of the book. On the other hand, an initial choice must be made.
If the author is to tell in detail what each particular section does, the
treatment of various sections under one topic becomes impractical because
of the mass of material involved. Here Professor Steinheimer has chosen to
speak to the well informed, those who are already familiar with the Code and
official comments, and his book is closer to an annotated statute than it is
to a text.
In the introduction, it is stated: "It has been . . . [the author's] purpose simply to indicate what changes would be made and the nature of
these changes leaving it to the reader to form his own judgment as to their
desirability." 6 He appears, in this respect, to bend over backward. Although
he has stated a position favorable to Article 3 elsewhere,7 the few instances
of evaluation in this book indicate situations where the Code might have
been improved.a Even where alternative sections are provided for adoption,
he has limited himself to stating which is most in accord with current Michigan practice.9
Since the book is intended to compare the Code with Michigan law, the
initial policy decisions embodied in the Code are not always highlighted.
Under section 20 of the NIL a question was presented concerning whether
an unauthorized agent .signing a negotiable instrument with full disclosure
of his representative capacity became liable on the instrument in addition to
his liability on a warranty theory. In a leading New York case,10 Judge
Cardozo found a negative implication in section 20 creating such liability,

5Pp. 33, 48-49, 77-78, 111-12. Cf. HAWXLAND, COMMERCIAL PAPER 34-35 (1959).
6Pp. v-vi.
7 Steinheimer, Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform Commercial Code, Mich.
S.B.J., Aug. 1960, pp. 20, 25.
8 E.g., pp. IO, 29 nn.46, 57.
9 See, e.g., pp. 36-37 discussing § 3-121.
lONew Georgia Nat'! Bank v. Lippman, 249 N.Y. 307, 164 N.E. 108 (1928); accord,
R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 324 (2), comment a, illustration 4 (1958).
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a view which has not received the approval of the Michigan Supreme
Court.1 1 Section 3-404 (1) of the Code imposes liability on the agent in
favor of any person who in good faith pays the instrument or takes it for
value. I£ we assume that the alleged principal was insolvent at the time of
the transaction, this involves a policy decision that the original payee should
enjoy an advantage because a negotiable instrument is involved in the
transaction.12 Professor Steinheimer limits himself to an indication that the
Michigan result would be changed,13 and those who wish to inquire into
the basic premises of the Code on this point must tum elsewhere.
In addition to its comparative function, the book serves two other purposes. First, it is a current study of Michigan negotiable instruments law.
Unfortunately, the lack of an index diminishes its value to the practitioner
who is unfamiliar with the Code. Second, and perhaps more important,
it demonstrates the impact of Article 3 upon the law of a fairly typical
jurisdiction. Careful studies of this kind, especially where there is a common Uniform Act in the background, have value extending beyond the
boundaries of one state. For those states yet to begin an intensive investigation of their own, Professor Steinheimer's book is one which should be
studied carefully.
One question remains after examining the book. Will effective use be
made of it? Of course the reading is not very light. The subject matter
is one which, at least to the reviewer, has never possessed a great deal of
intrinsic excitement. But more important than this is the attitude of those
who must pass judgment on the Code and for whose use this book is intended. The easy way is to take another person's opinion. The difficult,
but better, way is to study Professor Steinheimer's book and similar works
and puzzle through the new statutory scheme. It is hoped that the latter
course will be pursued in Michigan and elsewhere. With excellent material
such as this available, the difficulty of making a reasoned evaluation of
Article 3 is greatly diminished, and the obligation to do so is correspondingly increased.
Douglass G. Boshkoff,
Associate Professor of Law,
Wayne State University
11 Annis v. Pfeiffer, 278 Mich. 692, 271 N .W. 568 (1937).
12 The advantage is that the original payee may recover on the instrument instead
of being required to prove damages caused by breach of warranty of authority. This
advantage is substantial if the purported principal is insolvent and the warranty theory
would not produce an amount equal to the amount of the instrument. Cf. R.EsrATEMENT
{SECOND), AGENCY § 329, comment j (1958).
Professor Hawkland argues that the Code rule is justified because someone must be
liable on the instrument. Perhaps this is true when the instrument has passed from the
payee to a subsequent holder, but there appears to be no policy justifying creation of an
additional liability of agent to payee when only rights of the original parties to the
transaction are in question. See HAWKLANn, COMMERCIAL PAPER 33 (1959).
13 Pp. 81·82.

